

## Message Text

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03487 01 OF 02 060528Z

11

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 IO-10

SAM-01 SAB-01 OMB-01 /079 W  
----- 071996

R 051355Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6967  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 3487

E O 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG XF

SUBJECT: ISRAELI PRESS ON PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS  
AFTER SALZBURG

1. FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLES APPEARING IN  
JUNE 5 ISRAELI PRESS BY LEADING ISRAELI REPORTERS IN BOTH WASHING-  
TON AND JERUSALEM ON GENERAL THEME OF PROSPECTS FOR  
NEGOTIATIONS IN AFTERMATH OF SALZBURG.

2. FROM WASHINGTON, MAARIV (SEGEV) WRITES BEGIN  
TEXT: THE US BELIEVES THAT, AFTER A KISSINGER MID  
EAST TRIP IN JULY AND DETERMINED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN  
THE PARTIES, AN ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN INTERIM SETTLEMENT  
IS POSSIBLE BY THE END OF AUGUST... INFORMATION  
GATHERED FROM DIPLOMATIC AND CONGRESS SOURCES  
INDICATES THAT THE EGYPTIAN POSITION HAS CHANGED. SADAT  
IS NOW APPARENTLY WILLING TO EXTEND THE UN MANDATE  
BY 3 YEARS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER TWO YEARS  
IN RETURN FOR A DEEP WITHDRAWAL IN SINAI AND AN ISRAELI  
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03487 01 OF 02 060528Z

UNDERTAKING TO REACH A SIMILAR INTERIM SETTLEMENT  
WITH SYRIA BEFORE THE PRESENT YEAR IS OUT. SADAT  
ALSO WANTS A CLEAR AMERICAN PROMISE THAT ISRAEL  
WILL NOT REGARD THIS AS JUSTIFYING STAGNATION FOR

THE DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT. HE INSISTS THAT THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS PEACE MUST CONTINUE, POSSIBLY IN THE THE FORM OF FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. FORD APPARENTLY REFUSED TO COMMIT HIMSELF ON A SPECIFIC WITHDRAWAL LINE OR TO A DETAILED AMERICAN MAP OF ISRAEL'S FUTURE BORDERS, BUT SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN SADAT SOME IDEA ABOUT HOW THE US ENVISAGES THESE BORDERS. WHAT THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THIS IS NOT RELIABLY KNOW, BUT MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT IT DIFFERS LITTLE FROM THE ROGERS PLAN, WHILE ALSO TAKING IN THE QUESTION OF BORDERS WITH SYRIA AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.. THE SOURCES CLAIM THE US POSITION ON SYRIA HAS ALSO CHANGED: WASHINGTON NO LONGER BELIEVES THAT THE ARAB FRONT CAN BE SPOILT AND THAT A SEPARATE SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT IS POSSIBLE, AND SEEMS TO HAVE PROMISED TO SUPPORT A FURTHER SETTLEMENT ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AS SOON AS THE SINAI INTERIM SETTLEMENT IS AGREED ON... ASSUMING THAT ISRAEL REACTS POSITIVELY TO EGYPT'S OFFERS -- AND KISSINGER MADE CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTS THAT -- KISSINGER WILL RETURN TO THE MID EAST TOWARDS THE END OF JULY, AFTER MEETING GROMYKO IN GENEVA, IN ORDER TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE ACTUAL AGREEMENT IS EXPECTED TO BE SIGNED IN AUGUST. ON LEARNING ALL THIS, DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN WASHINGTON EXPECT GENEVA WILL NOT RECONVENE BEFORE NEXT YEAR, AFTER AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT WITH SYRIA. US OFFICIALS WERE REPORTEDLY MUCH IMPRESSED BY SADAT'S MODERATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAEL'S DIFFICULTIES. THEY SAY THAT BECAUSE OF URGENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, SADAT IS NOW KEENER THAN BEFORE ON AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT, AND SAYS THE SAME IS TRUE OF SYRIA. END TEXT

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 TEL AV 03487 01 OF 02 060528Z

3. ALSO FROM WASHINGTON , HAARETZ (MARGALIT) WRITES BEGIN TEXT: KISSINGER THINKS THAT IF THERE IS AN AWARENESS OF THE WORLD SITUATION IN ISRAEL, THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WILL AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS IN STAGES. THE SECRETARY ALSO HINTED THAT IF THAT IS NOT THE CASE, WASHINGTON MAY IMPOSE AN ENFOCED SOLUTION AND DEMAND WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1967 BORDERS AND "VATICAN CITY" STATUS FOR JERUSALEM. KISSINGER'S REMARKS ARE PART OF THE PRESSURE HE ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ON ISRAEL IN ANTICIPATION OF RABIN'S VISIT IN WASHINGTON AND ARE CONNECTED WITH HIS ANGER OVER THE LETTER OF THE 76 SENATORS... ALL COMEN-

TATORS WHO HAVE COME BACK FROM EUROPE THINK ISRAEL  
WILL AGREE TO A THREE-YEAR PARTIAL AGREEMENT.  
ACCORDING TO ONE VERSION EGYPT IS PREPARED TO EXTEND  
THE UN MANDATE FOR THE ENTIRE THREE-YEAR PERIOD  
AT ONCE. SOME COMMENTATORS THINK KISSINGER'S  
MID EAST SHUTTLE WILL START IN AUGUST, NOT  
IN JULY, BECAUSE THE US WANTS THOROUGH PREPARATIONS  
TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. SISCO  
MAY COME EARLIER FOR THE FIRST PART OF THE  
SHUTTLE. RABIN, THE COMMENTATORS SAY, WILL BE  
PUT UNDER PRESSURE TO AGREE TO THOSE CONDITIONS,  
AND THERE WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE  
PROSPECTS OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. THE GENERAL  
FEELING IS THAT AN AGREEMENT IS TO BE EXPECTED  
SOON. END TEXT.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03487 02 OF 02 060533Z

15  
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 IO-10

SAM-01 SAB-01 OMB-01 /079 W  
----- 072028

R 051355Z JUN 75  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6968  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 3487

4 IN SEPARATE ARTICLE, MARGALIT REPORTED  
AS FOLLOWS ON APPEARANCE OF AMB TOON BEFORE  
SFRC. BEGIN TEXT: AMB-DESIGNATE MALCOLM  
TOON SAID THAT... THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
THE US AND ISRAEL SHOULD NOT PREVENT AMERICAN  
MEDIATION IN THE MID EAST. THE ISRAELI THINOUT  
GESTURE WAS NOT VERY IMPORTANT MILITARILY, BUT  
VERY HELPFUL POLITICALLY....HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER  
THE US PEACE PLAN FOR THE MID EAST WOULD BE  
DETAILED. A SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM  
SHOULD BE FOUND WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR THE  
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES. ISRAEL'S

DESIRE FOR SECURITY, THE ARAB DESIRE FOR TERRITORY AND THE DEMANDS OF THE PALESTINIANS WERE THE THREE MAIN PROBLEMS IN THE MID EAST. THE JERUSALEM PROBLEM WOULD HAVE TO BE SOLVED, BUT HE DID NOT INCLUDE IT AMONG THE THREE MAIN ONES. END TEXT.

5. PRESENTING THE PERSPECTIVE FROM JERUSALEM,  
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03487 02 OF 02 060533Z

HAARETZ (GOLAN) CARRIES FOLLOWING STORY:  
BEGIN TEXT: IN WASHINGTON, RABIN WILL PRESENT THE MAIN IDEAS, THOUGH NOT DETAILS, OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT TO BE ACHIEVED IN STAGES IN THE COURSE OF A FEW YEARS. THE PLAN WAS WORKED OUT IN CONTACTS ON A RESTRICTED SCALE IN JERUSALEM, IN WHICH SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES WERE CONSIDERED. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS, THE OPINION EMERGED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT AGREE TO WITHDRAW TO ADJUSTED 1967 BORDERS WITHOUT A PEACE SETTLEMENT, AND SINCE THE ARAB STATES OBJECT TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT AS ISRAEL UNDERSTANDS IT, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT THAT WOULD LAY DOWN THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATION FOR EACH ACT OF WITHDRAWAL, UNTIL THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL STAGE FOR WHICH THE CONSIDERATION WOULD BE AN ACTUAL PEACE AGREEMENT. SUCH A PROCESS WOULD ALSO MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO VERIFY INTENTIONS AT EVERY STAGE, AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE THAT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE ARAB STATES TO SIGN A STABLE, DURABLE PEACE AGREEMENT... IT IS LEARNED THAT IF KISSINGER COMES TO THE MID EAST TOWARDS THE END OF JULY, IT WILL NOT BE FOR ANOTHER SHUTTLE BUT IN ORDER TO BE PRESENT AT THE END OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. INFORMED GOVT SOURCES SAY KISSINGER HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HE WILL NOT COME FOR ANY SHUTTLE UNLESS THE OUTCOME IS ASSURED. JERUSALEM CONCLUDES THAT WHETHER KISSINGER COMES, DEPENDS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE FORD-RABIN TALKS. ONLY IF IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT WILL WORK OUT, WILL KISSINGER COME. END TEXT.  
VELIOTES

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PRESS COMMENTS, MINISTERIAL VISITS, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACE TALKS, POLITICAL CONCESSIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 05 JUN 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975TELAV03487  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D750197-0898  
**From:** TEL AVIV  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750699/baaaaetf.tel  
**Line Count:** 212  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION NEA  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** greeneet  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 13 MAR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <13 MAR 2003 by PhilliR0>; APPROVED <20 JAN 2004 by greeneet>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PFOR, IS, EG, XF, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)  
**To:** STATE INFO AMMAN  
AMEBASSY BEIRUT  
CAIRO  
DAMASCUS  
JERUSALEM  
JIDDA

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006